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1 introduction
In natural sciences, the most interesting and relevant questions are the so-
called why-questions. What is a why-question? A why-question is nothing
else than a question in the form “Why P?” (or “Why is P true?”) where P
is an arbitrary statement.
There are several different approaches to why-questions and explanations
in the literature, see, for example, [5], [6], [7], [15]. However, most of the
literature deals with why-questions about particular events, such as “Why did
Adam eat the apple?”. Even the best known theory of explanation, Hempel’s
covering law model, is designed for explaining particular events. Here we
only deal with purely theoretical why-questions about general phenomena
of physics, for instance “Why can no observer move faster than light?” or
“Why are Kepler’s laws valid?”.
Here we are not going to develop a whole new theory of why-questions in
physics. We will just touch upon some ideas and examples relevant to our
subject.
1
2 answering why-questions
How to answer a why-question? For example, let NoFTL be the statement
“No observer can move faster than light,” which is one of the several aston-
ishing predictions of relativity. As it is a statement that hard to believe, it
is natural to ask why it is so. The standard answers to the question “Why
NoFTL?” are
1. “NoFTL is true because the 4-dimensional Minkowski spacetime over
R (the field of real numbers) is a good model of our physical world;
and in this model NoFTL is valid.”
2. “NoFTL is an axiom (of Special Relativity).”
Neither of these answers is satisfactory to a logician. The problem with
the first is that it refers to one particular model and not to a list of axioms.
The second does not really answer the question, it is a kind of “just because”
answer.
How to give satisfactory answers to why-questions in physics? First of all
to answer the question “Why P?”, we need a formal language in which we
can formulate P and the possible answers to it. Let us fix one such language.1
The possible answers to the question “Why P?” are consistent theories which
do not contain P as an axiom.2 Here we do not require theories to be
deductively closed systems, as we would like to separate the assumptions
of the theory from its consequences. Hence we use the term theory as a
synonym for axiom system. Let us call a possible answer acceptable answer
if it implies P .
To present some examples of acceptable answers to the question “Why
NoFTL?”, let us consider the following two-sorted first-order language:
{Q ,+, ·, <;B , IOb,Ph;W },
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where Q is the sort of quantities and B is the sort of bodies; · and + are
binary function symbols and < is a binary relation symbol of sort Q ; IOb (for
inertial observers) and Ph (for light signals or photons) are unary relation
symbols of sort B ; and W (for the world-view relation) is a 6-ary relation
symbol of the type B ×B ×Q ×Q ×Q ×Q . Relations IOb(o) and Ph(b) are
translated as “o is an inertial observer,” and “b is a photon,” respectively. We
use the world-view relation W to speak about coordinatization by translating
W(o, b, x, y, z, t) as “observer o coordinatizes body b at spacetime location
〈x, y, z, t〉,” (that is, at space location 〈x, y, z〉 and at instant t).
In this language we can define the term speedo(b) as the speed of a body b
according to observer o. Hence we can formulate that no observer can move
faster than light. Moreover, we can prove the following:
SpecRel |= ∀o, o′, p IOb(o) ∧ IOb(o′) ∧ Ph(p) =⇒ speedo(o′) < speedo(p),
where SpecRel is the consistent axiom system of the following axioms:
AxField: The quantity part 〈Q ; +, ·, <〉 is an ordered field.
AxSelf: Every observer coordinatizes itself at a coordinate point if and only
if its space component is the origin, that is, space location 〈0, 0, 0〉.
AxPh: The speed of light signals is 1 according to every inertial observer.
AxEv: Every inertial observer coordinatizes the very same set of events.
AxSymd: Inertial observers agree as for the spatial distance between events
if these events are simultaneous for both of them.
For the formulation of these concepts and axioms, see, for example [1], [13].
So SpecRel is an acceptable answer to the question “Why NoFTL?”.
3
3 how to compare the different answers
How to get better and better answers to a certain why-question? The basic
idea is that “the less it assumes, the better an answer is.” Let us try to make
this idea more precise by introducing the following concepts:
1. Th2 is nonworse than Th1 as an answer to the question “Why P?” if
all the formulas of Th2 are consequences of Th1, that is, Th1 implies
ϕ2 for any formula ϕ2 ∈ Th2.
2. Th2 is piecewise nonworse than Th1 as an answer to the question “Why
P?” if for any formula ϕ2 ∈ Th2 there is ϕ1 ∈ Th1 such that ϕ1 implies
ϕ2.
It is easy to see the following:
1. Both concepts above are preorders on sets of formulas, that is, they are
transitive and reflexive relations.
2. Th2 is a piecewise nonworse answer than Th1 if Th2 ⊆ Th1.
3. Th2 is a nonworse answer than Th1 if it is piecewise nonworse.
Let us say that Th2 is (piecewise) better than Th1 if it is (piecewise) non-
worse and nonequivalent according to the equivalence relation defined by the
corresponding preorder.
These definitions fit in with the following idea of Michael Friedman [5]:
“Science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total num-
ber of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given.”
To present another example, let us note that the following theorem can
also be proved:
SpecRel0 |= ∀o, o′, p IOb(o) ∧ IOb(o′) ∧ Ph(p) =⇒ speedo(o′) < speedo(p),
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where SpecRel0 consists of the following four axioms only: AxField, AxSelf,
AxPh and AxEv. Hence SpecRel0 is a piecewise better answer to the question
“Why NoFTL?” than SpecRel. Further answers to this question, which are
not comparable to SpecRel0 according to the preorders above, can be found
in [11, Thms. 3 and 5].
Let us note that, according to the definition above, a theory consisting
of two (nonequivalent) axioms is a piecewise better answer than a theory
consisting of their conjunctions. That is a nice property as it makes the
introduction of the following concept possible. Let us say that a possible
answer to the question “Why P?” is pointless if there is a piecewise bet-
ter answer which contains P as an axiom. Accordingly, the conjunction of
Kepler’s laws and Boyle’s law is a pointless answer to the question “Why
Kepler’s laws are valid?”. So it eliminates a problem that motivated Hempel
to introduce his covering law model only for the explanation of particular
events, see [6].
4 general answers
In the previous section, we dealt with answers to one particular question.
However, in physics it is a general desire to search for unified theories, that
is, theories answering more questions. So a good answer in physics is char-
acterized by assuming little, but implying a lot.3
The unification of theories is the point where we have to leave the conve-
nience of fixed languages and search for suitable unification of the languages
of the theories in question, too. For example, the juxtaposition of the axioms
of relativity and quantum theories in their combined language will result in
one theory but it will not solve the problem of their reconciliation. Though
it will be consistent (as its parts are consistent) and will imply all the pre-
diction of relativity and quantum theories, it will not be what we mean by a
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unified theory. To achieve a truly unified theory, we need a richer language
in which we can formulate the interrelations between the concepts of these
theories. However, unifying the languages in an appropriate way and for-
mulating new axioms in this unified language to establish the interrelations
between their concepts such that the unified theory has new experimentally
testable predictions is a very difficult task.
5 the truth of axioms of physics
Most theories of why-questions require the explanations to be true, see, for
example, [6]. However, it is a fundamental requirement of a physical theory
to be experimentally testable, hence refutable. So in physics we do not know
whether an axiom is true or not, we just presume so. Therefore, if we require
the explanations to be true, we will never ascertain whether our theory is
really an explanation or not. Hence in the case of why-questions of physics,
it is better not to require the axioms to be true.
For example, if we required the axioms of physics to be true, we could not
say that Newton’s theory is an explanation of Kepler’s laws because Newton’s
theory is refuted by some experimental facts.4 That would be inconvenient
as Newton’s theory is the standard example in the literature for explanation
of Kepler’s laws. Hence it is better to treat the axioms as possible truths
and treat the matter only in conditional, that is, an answer to the question
“Why P?” means that “If the theory is true, then so is P .” In this sense it
is still meaningful to say that Newton’s theory explains Kepler’s laws. And
according to the above definition Newton’s theory is an acceptable answer
to the question “Why Kepler’s laws are valid?”.
6
6 some further examples
We can take the Twin Paradox (TwP) and ask “Why TwP?”. In the language
of SpecRel, we cannot formulate the full version of TwP only its inertial
approximation called the Clock Paradox (ClP). Here we only concentrate on
TwP but for similar investigation of ClP, see [13], [14]. To formulate the
full version of TwP we have to extend the language above for accelerated
(that is, non-inertial) observers, which is done by adding one more unary
relation for accelerated observers on the sort of bodies. In this language we
can formulate TwP, see [9], [13]. Let us denote the formulated version of
TwP as TwP.
The most natural axiom to assume about accelerated observers is the
following:
AxCmv: At each moment of its world-line, every accelerated observer coor-
dinatizes the nearby world for a short while in the same way as an
inertial observer does.
For precise formulation of this axiom, see [9], [13]. Let AccRel be the axiom
system consisting of AxCmv and all the five axioms of SpecRel.
Surprisingly, AccRel does not answer the question “Why TwP?”. More-
over, the following can be proved:
AccRel ∪ Th(R) 6|= TwP,
where Th(R) is the whole first-order theory of real numbers, see [9]. At
first sight this result suggests that the question “Why TwP?” cannot be
answered within first-order logic, which would be depressing as there are
weighty methodological reasons for staying within first-order logic, see, for
example, [3], [13]. However, there is a first-order axiom scheme (IND) in
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the above language such that AccRel together with this scheme answers the
question “Why TwP?”, see [9], [13].
The why-question “Why gravity slows time down?”, can be answered by
the theory AccRel ∪ IND and Einstein’s equivalence principle, see [10], [13].
For further examples, let us consider the question of “Why does relativis-
tic mass increase?” or “Why the rest masses of inelastically colliding inertial
bodies is smaller than the rest mass of the originated inertial body?”. The-
ories SpecRelDyn and SpecRelDyn+ are possible answers to these questions,
respectively, see [4], [13].
7 concluding remarks
In the spirit of reverse mathematics, we have introduced a precise definition
of acceptable answers to why-questions in physics and some ideas about
how to compare these answers. We also presented several examples mainly
from axiomatic relativity. Finally let us note that the work done by the
Hungarian research group of Logic and Relativity led by Andre´ka Hajnal and
Istva´n Ne´meti can be considered as providing explanations to why-questions
of relativity, see references.
Notes
1Every concept we introduce here is relative to a fixed language in which P can be
formulated.
2It is important that we restrict our definition to possible answers to why-questions in
physics because, for example, in mathematics the possible answers to why-questions are
usually proofs and not theories. See, for example, [12].
3Of course there are other desired requirements of a physical theory, such as simplicity
and comprehensibility of the axioms or experimental testability. However, it is not easy
to define these concepts precisely if it is possible at all.
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4For example, the perihelion advance of Mercury is a well known experimental fact
that disproves Newton’s theory.
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